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GOTTA GET A GET: MARYLAND AND 
FLORIDA SHOULD ADOPT GET STATUTES 
Jill Wexler* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
After suffering mental and emotional abuse for thirteen years, 
Rachel, a mother of four, sought a divorce from her husband.
1
 
Although it was unknown to Rachel at the time, her husband‘s 
abuse would continue well after the civil divorce papers were 
signed. He refused to give her a Jewish divorce,
2
 which would 
leave her unable to ―remarry within the Jewish faith,‖3 unless she 
abandoned her claims for alimony and child support for her four 
young children.
4
 While Rachel was anxious to move forward with 
her life, she was bound to her former husband in the eyes of the 
Jewish faith until he provided her with this divorce.
5
 After five 
long years of bitter fighting and living in marital limbo, Rachel 
                                                        
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; B.A., University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2007. The author wishes to thank her mom for her love, guidance and 
constant reassurance; her grandma for endless inspiration; and Josh for his 
encouragement, love and patience. She would also like to thank the rest of her 
family for their support: Dad, Abby, and Alan. Finally, she would like to thank 
Professors Aliza Kaplan and Joel Gora for their advice and educational 
direction, as well as the Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial assistance. 
1 Gail Ravnitzky-Silberglied, JCADA Working to Help Agunot, or 
“Chained Women”, http://www.jwi.org/site/c.okLWJ3MPKtH/b.2541223/ 
k.2C98/JCADA_Working_to_Help_Agunot_or_Chained_Women.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
2 A Jewish divorce occurs when a husband gives his wife a ―get.‖ Plural 
gittin. See infra Part I.A.  
3 Ravnitzky-Silberglied, supra note 1. 
 4 Id.  
5 See id.  
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ceded to her husband‘s demands in exchange for a Jewish divorce.6 
She became the sole provider for her four children and had to make 
―major adjustments in their lives . . . [she] had to work full time to 
pay their bills, yet still could not maintain anywhere near their 
former lifestyle . . . [and] their standard of living dropped 
significantly.‖7 Rachel‘s story is only one of thousands, which 
have been told around the country, featuring women unable to 
obtain a Jewish divorce until they comply with their husband‘s 
threats and demands.
8
  
This manipulation of the system is called the agunah problem.
9
 
This Note describes the current state of the agunah problem and 
uses the conditions in Florida and Maryland—states with 
significant Jewish populations
10—to illustrate the need for reform. 
This Note focuses on these two states in particular because of the 
potential for widespread support, as Florida and Maryland 
lawmakers have attempted their own versions of a get statute in 
recent years. Although passage of the proposed statutes seemed 
close to fruition at various points, administrative and political 
hindrances disrupted the momentum. However, an adjusted 
approach by lawmakers in these two states, using New York‘s 
success as the paradigm, would appropriately counter the growing 
coercive and extortive tactics that affect the substantial Jewish 
populations in both states and protect burdened women in these 
communities who have no other refuge. Such a program would 
                                                        
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Over the past twenty-five years, divorce rates have grown to 
approximately thirty-three percent of marriages. Jeremy Glicksman, Almost, But 
Not Quite: The Failure of New York‟s Get Statute, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 300, 302 
(2006); see also FL. JUD. SERVS., BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT, S. 2008-96, at 5 (Fl. 1008), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/ 
data/session/2008/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2008s0096.ju.pdf [hereinafter FL. 
JUD. SERVS.]. Almost six million Jews live in America, and data reveal that 
15,000 Orthodox Jews in New York are considered to be in ―marital limbo‖ and 
unable to obtain a Jewish divorce. Glicksman, supra at 302–03. ―Marital 
Limbo‖ is a term of art designed to describe the position of an agunah. See id. at 
303.  
9 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
10 See infra notes 106, 108.  
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require minimal state funds, and a properly drafted law could avoid 
the limited constitutional entanglements with respect to the First 
Amendment. In light of the success of the New York get statute, 
the adoption of similar statutes in both Florida and Maryland 
should be encouraged as a necessary action by these state 
governments.  
In Part I, this Note outlines the current problem of the agunah
11
 
and presents some of the major legal and non-legal attempts to 
alleviate the problem. While contract law offers a legal solution, 
this has generally been unsuccessful because holdings are 
unpredictable, especially in different jurisdictions. Non-legal 
options have also been attempted, but result in inconsistencies and 
inequitable remedies. Legislation is a better alternative because it 
provides uniformity on which people can rely and deters husbands 
from engaging in coercive tactics. In Part II, this Note surveys the 
different forms of legislation that have been proposed in Florida 
(Removal of Religious Barriers to Remarriage) and Maryland 
(Equitable Distribution Law), and discusses why these types of 
statutes are necessary in both states. Next, in Part III, this Note 
addresses the constitutional concerns that may arise from these 
proposed statutes and suggests how a properly drafted law, such as 
the law passed in New York, can alleviate such concerns. Lastly, 
using the New York law as a paradigm, this Note provides 
suggestions for Maryland and Florida concerning ways they can 
improve their proposed get statutes.  
A. The “Get” 
Although divorce laws in the United States have long enabled 
parties to dissolve their marriages with support of the civil system, 
for many observant Jewish women the divorce process is more 
complicated and problematic. While Jewish principles encourage 
marriages to be permanent and ―indissoluble union[s],‖ it is also 
recognized that matrimonial unions are sometimes breached.
12
 One 
                                                        
11 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
12 BENJAMIN MIELZINER, JEWISH LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 115 
(Bloch Publ‘g Co. 1901). 
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main passage in Deuteronomy anticipates marital problems and 
describes the manner in which one should obtain a divorce. This 
passage states:  
When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it 
come to pass that she found no favor in his eyes, because 
he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write 
her a bill of divorcement, and give in her hand, and send 
her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his 
house, she may go and become another man‘s wife.13 
Judaism firmly establishes that human suffering should be 
mitigated and, therefore, divorces are acceptable in certain 
circumstances.
14
 
Under Jewish law, a woman becomes free to remarry if one of 
two events occurs: one, her husband passes away, or two, her 
husband delivers her a get.
15
 A get is defined as a ―bill of 
divorce,‖16 which a wife must receive and only a husband can 
deliver.
17
 The standard form of a get document reads as follows:  
On the __________ day of the week, the __________ day 
of the month of __________ in the year __________ from 
the creation of the world according to the calendar 
reckoning we are accustomed to count here, in the city 
__________ . . . which is located on the river 
__________ . . . and situated near wells of water, I, 
__________ . . . the son of __________ . . . who today am 
present in the city __________ . . . which is located on the 
                                                        
13 Id. at 116 (citing 24 Deuteronomy 1:2 (King James)). 
14 Id. The Beth Din, ―a duly constituted court of Jewish Law,‖ IRWIN H. 
HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 145 (1983), will allow a wife to 
demand a divorce if her husband: develops a terrible disease, is sterile or 
impotent, does not provide support, declines cohabitation, physically or verbally 
abuses her, compels his wife to violate religious law, engages in physically 
revolting occupations, becomes an apostate, or habitually engages in acts of 
infidelity. Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, 
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 333 n.80 (1992). See 
also MIELZINER, supra note 12, at 123. 
15 HAUT, supra note 14, at 17; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 319. 
16 HAUT, supra note 14, at 145. 
17 Id. at 18.  
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river __________ . . . and situated near wells of water, do 
willingly consent, being under no restraint, to release, to set 
free and put aside thee, my wife __________ . . . daughter 
of __________ . . . who art today in the city of 
__________ . . . which is located on the river 
__________ . . . and situated near wells of water, who has 
been my wife from before. Thus do I set free, release thee, 
and put thee aside, in order that thou may have permission 
and the authority over thy self to go and marry any man 
thou may desire. No person may hinder thee from this day 
onward, and thou are permitted to every man. This shall be 
for thee from me a bill of dismissal, a letter of release, and 
a document of freedom, in accordance with the law of 
Moses and the Sages Israel.
18
 
As described in eyewitness accounts, the get process is a 
simple one-hour ceremony performed in front of three rabbis.
19
 
The parties spend most of their time in front of the rabbi filling out 
paperwork with proper names, dates, residences, and words of 
separation, and then two witnesses sign the bottom of the 
document.
20
 At the end of the ceremony, the husband and wife are 
asked whether either of the parties were coerced or placed under 
duress or extortion to enter into the agreement.
21
 Following this, 
the husband takes the document and places it in his wife‘s hand; 
this marks the official delivery of the get.
22
 At this point, the 
woman is permitted to marry another man, subject to certain 
restrictions.
23
 In comparison, a civil divorce is not considered a 
                                                        
18 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 131 (1971); HAUT, supra note 14, at 17–18. 
19 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 320.  
20 See id. at 320–21; see also HAUT, supra note 14, at 27. 
21 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 321. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. The only men she may not marry are:  
(a) a Cohen-descendent of the priestly class, (b) a man with whom she 
committed adultery, (c) persons who served as witnesses for the get, (d) 
her former husband if in the interim she marries someone else who then 
dies or divorces her, or (e) her former husband if she was guilty of 
adultery during the course of a marriage.  
Id. 
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valid substitute to the get in the eyes of Conservative and Orthodox 
Jews, and thus in order to religiously dissolve a marriage, this 
ceremony must take place.
24
 
B. The “Agunah” Problem 
Jewish law leaves a wife in a difficult predicament, whereby if 
a husband does not deliver a get to his wife, it precludes her from 
the possibility of a religious divorce. This leaves the woman as an 
agunah,
25
 or a ―chained woman,‖ who remains married and cannot 
remarry in the Jewish community.
26
 The problem of the agunah is 
―one of the most complex in halakhic27 discussions‖28 because 
once a woman is tainted as an agunah, she is forbidden to 
remarry.
29
 If the agunah engages in sexual activity with another 
man and bears a child, that child is looked upon as a mamzerim, or 
―bastard.‖30 
To be valid, ―a get must be given by the husband of his free 
will and is therefore invalid if given while he is of unsound mind, 
                                                        
24 See id. at 313, 319, 321.   
25 Plural is agunot. Organizations and campaigners believe there are ―tens 
 of thousands‖ of agunot in the  
US alone while Orthodox authorities argue that there are very few. This 
is because Orthodox authorities view only the women whose husbands 
have disappeared as agunot; all others are mesurevet gittin) [sic] 
subjects of get refusal) who are in the process of negotiating a divorce, 
even where these negotiations drag on for decades. 
Lisa Fishbayn, Gender, Multiculturalism and Dialogue: The Case of Jewish 
Divorce, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 71, 96 n.3 (2008). 
26 HAUT, supra note 14, at 145; see also Glicksman, supra note 8, at 300. 
27 Alternative transliteration halachot, which refers to ―all of Jewish Law.‖ 
Judaism 101: A Glossary of Basic Jewish Terms and Concepts, 
http://www.ou.org/about/judaism/di.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
28 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 429 (1972).   
29 See Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a 
Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 139, 139 (1990). 
30 The mamzerim are ―forbidden to marry any Jew except another mamzer 
or a convert, and their children are also mamzerim. Thus, the social ostracism is 
hereditary.‖ Id.  
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or under duress contrary to law.‖31 Unlike the husband, if the wife 
opposes the divorce, Jewish law does not provide her with similar 
veto power.
32
 In order for a husband to be given a divorce, he need 
only present a justified reason
33
 and he may receive hetter nissu‟in, 
or ―permission to contract an additional marriage.‖34 The Jewish 
husband will not be considered an adulterer for taking a new wife, 
nor will his new children be branded as mamzerim.
35
 All of the 
power of a Jewish divorce rests with men—consequently, women 
are left standing on unequal and tenuous ground.  
The agunah problem has become more publicized in recent 
years, as men have increasingly used the impending ―chains‖ both 
as a means to extort their wives and as a ―bargaining chip‖36 to 
demand all of the marital property. Rabbi Irwin Haut explains that 
thousands of women have reported to him, as well as to other 
rabbis, that they were unable to obtain a get until they agreed 
wholesale to the terms their husbands demanded.
37
 The husbands 
use the elusive get as a proxy to extort more beneficial post-
separation conditions, including custody of the children and 
favorable division of the marital property.
38
 In a New York Times 
article, the author described former agunah Felice Bienenstock, 
and explained that, ―it took her three and a half years to obtain a 
get, but only after a civil court granted her a divorce.‖39 The author 
went on to state that Felice Bienenstock‘s ―husband beat her and 
took drugs and said he would give her a get only if she agreed to 
liberal visitation rights with their children.‖40 These husbands use 
                                                        
31 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 130 (1971) (emphasis added). 
32 MIELZINER, supra note 12, at 118. 
33 See id. at 117. 
34 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 430 (1972). This requires the husband to gain 
the signature of one hundred rabbis. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 131 (1971). 
35 See Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get 
Legislation Good Law?, 15 PACE L. REV. 703, 704 (1995). 
36 Id. at 705. 
37 HAUT, supra note 14, at 101–02. 
38 Feldman, supra note 29, at 140.  
39 John T. McQuiston, Jewish Divorce Law Plagues Wives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 1986 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. (emphasis added).  
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the get ―as a weapon in divorce litigation,‖41 and Jewish women 
are left with two options: give up all of their rights and assets or 
accept their position as an agunah in their communities.
42
 
More recently, the rising divorce rates in this country have 
caused the agunah to become more common in matrimonial 
actions.
43
 It has been estimated that thirty percent of Jewish 
marriages end in divorce,
44
 and in New York alone, there are 
15,000 Orthodox Jewish women ―who are civilly divorced but 
unable to obtain a get.‖45 These women are ―unable to remarry 
under Jewish law, and thus are forced to live in marital limbo.‖46 
C. Jewish Courts Attempt to Alleviate the Get Problem 
The tragedy of the agunah has become so urgent that rabbis, 
organizations, and legislators have attempted to resolve the 
problem in different ways. Highly sensitive to the women‘s 
undeserved suffering, rabbis and scholars created ―Constructive 
Consent,‖47 which allows the Beth Din48 to engage in forceful acts 
to compel the husband to give a get to his wife.
49
 The rabbis 
rationalized their actions in different halachah; for example, ―[we 
must] speak up for those who are mute,‖50 and ―[o]ne who is 
                                                        
41 HAUT, supra note 14, at 102. 
42 Feldman, supra note 29, at 140. 
43 See sources cited supra note 8.   
44 Mariah Wojdacz, What‟s the real status of marriage in America?, 
LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com/legal-articles//article13746.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009).  
45 HAUT, supra note 14, at 101. 
46 Id.  
47 Feldman, supra note 29, at 143. Constructive Consent is a ―legal fiction 
[which] permit[s] a [B]et[h] [D]in to use force and other means of coercion 
against the husband until he agree[s] to give a get. The tactics [may] range from 
community ostracism to corporal punishment.‖ Id.  
48 ―A duly constituted court of Jewish Law.‖ Plural is battei din. HAUT, 
supra note 14, at 145.  
49 Feldman, supra note 29, at 143. 
50 Aviad Hacohen, The Tears of the Oppressed: An Examination of the 
Agunah Problem: Background and Halakhic Sources, 54 JUDAISM 116 (2005) 
(quoting Proverbs 31:8). 
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halachically required to divorce his wife and refuses to do so, a 
Jewish bet[h] din – at any place and at any time – [may] 
corporeally punish him until he says, ‗I wish [to divorce].‘ The get 
is then written and it is a kosher get.‖51 Rabbis and scholars 
rationalize these severe punishments with the explanation that for a 
Jewish man who really wants to abide by Jewish law, it is his 
obligation to give his wife a get.
52
 In turn, the Beth Din applies 
pressure on the husband to ―release his wife where [his wife was] 
warranted.‖53 Rabbi Naftali Silberberg has explained that these 
tactics have included sanctions against those who carry on business 
with a husband who will not divorce his wife.
54
 
While ―Constructive Consent‖ has leveled the playing field 
somewhat, the legal fiction has crucial limitations.
55
 One such 
limitation is that only a Beth Din can apply this method, and not a 
civil court, or else the get is considered invalid.
56
 Therefore, a Beth 
Din could choose not to intervene if it believes a divorce is 
inappropriate.
57
 The Jewish courts are also limited in applying 
force on non-compliant husbands because today, unlike long ago, 
Jewish communities live under the laws of their respective states 
and must act within those parameters.
58
 For instance, Beth Din 
judges, or Dayanim, cannot apply too much force upon a husband 
or the Dayanim may be held civilly or criminally responsible 
                                                        
51 Naftali Silberberg, Chabad.org, The Agunah, http://www.chabad.org/ 
library/article_cdo/aid/613084/jewish/The-Agunah.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2009). 
52 HAUT, supra note 14, at 23. 
53 Hacohen, supra note 50, at 116.  
54 Silberberg, supra note 51. 
55 Feldman, supra note 29, at 143.  
56 HAUT, supra note 14, at 23–24; see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 143.  
A get issued on the basis of threats from a court is only valid if there 
has been a finding by the [B]et[h] [D]in that the husband may be 
compelled to divorce his wife under Jewish Law, and if a secular court 
does not itself compel the execution of the get, but simply coerces the 
husband [to follow the instructions of the Beth Din]. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
57 HAUT, supra note 14, at 24–25.  
58 Silberberg, supra note 51; see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 144. 
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within the state.
59
 Not surprisingly, as discussed in the next 
subpart, other groups and organizations have tried to step in where 
the Jewish courts‘ actions are limited.  
D. Organizations  
Throughout the country, groups have organized to respond to 
the tragedy of the agunah. These organizations use different 
techniques to persuade the husband to provide a get.
60
 One such 
organization, Getting Equitable Treatment (GET), provides 
information and counseling to women who are suffering from this 
barrier to remarriage.
61
 Other groups exert influence by posting 
announcements on websites revealing men who would not give 
gittin,
62
 publishing notices in the Jewish Press, or circulating 
agunah pins, which read ―Freedom for Agunot Now.‖63 While 
these groups have raised the general public‘s awareness of the 
problem, they, like the Jewish courts, lack the authority and 
jurisdiction to compel a husband to deliver the get.  
                                                        
59 ―In Israel, rabbinic courts can impose fines and order a man to be placed 
in jail for refusing to deliver a get. . . . [S]ometimes husbands have spent years 
in jail instead of giving gittin.‖ Feldman, supra note 29, at n.35 (citing HAUT, 
supra note 14, at 85–86) (emphasis added).  
60 HAUT, supra note 14, at 102–03. 
61 JOFA Advocacy for Agunot, Other Agunah Organizations and Resource 
Links, http://www.jofa.org/about.php/advocacy/otheragunaho (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
62 The Awareness Center posts such announcements:  
Sam Rosenbloom is owner of the succhah.com.  He has refused to give 
his wife a get (a Jewish divorce decree). He also is non-complaint with 
the Beit-din (Jewish court panel). Until he gives a get, his wife cannot 
remarry. Please do not buy from his website. Let him know that this is 
unacceptable behavior.  
The Awareness Center, Case of Sam Rosenbloom, http://www.theawareness 
center.org/Rosenbloom_Sam.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Awareness Center].  
63 Rivka Haut, Jewish Women and the Feminist Revolution, 
http://jwa.org/feminism/_html/JWA033.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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E. Contract Remedy 
Recognizing that non-legal attempts provide limited success, 
secular courts have recently begun to confront the get issue in 
matrimonial actions. Through the use of contract law, courts have 
found either express or implied agreements between couples that 
require the husband to perform the get or, in the alternative, find 
him in breach of contract. While attempts to use contract law to 
deal with the agunah problem have frequently been successful, 
outcomes are inconsistent and courts oftentimes fashion remedies 
that are not in the best interests of either party. Additionally, these 
remedies may be constitutionally problematic under the First 
Amendment.
64
 
The contract remedy has proven most effective when a couple 
includes a written agreement in their divorce settlement or pre-
annulment agreement in which the husband is obligated to grant 
his wife a get once the parties have been civilly divorced.
65
 In this 
situation, should a husband fail to complete his ―contractual 
undertaking[s],‖ the wife would bring an ―equitable action for 
specific performance.‖66 In Koeppel v. Koeppel, for example, the 
wife sued her husband to uphold their pre-annulment agreement 
and deliver her a get upon ―the dissolution of [their] marriage.‖67 
The husband moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the 
provision offended his First Amendment rights.
68
 The court denied 
the motion to dismiss, reasoning that specific performance would 
simply compel the husband to do something that he had contracted 
                                                        
64 See discussion infra Part III. 
65 See Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 339–42. 
66 Id. at 340. An action for specific performance is brought in lieu of an 
action for money damages because financial compensation would be inadequate 
in this situation. Many states, like Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania, refuse to 
enforce these agreements, ―either on the theory that judicially compelling a 
religious divorce would excessively entangle the state in sectarian matters, 
offending the Establishment Clause, or on the narrower ground that such an 
order is beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the court.‖ Id.  
67 Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). 
68 Id. at 373. 
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to do.
69
 Professor Breitowitz noted that ―the mere fact that a 
ceremony, procedure, or activity is governed by religious law does 
not preclude its civil enforcement by way of a simple contract.‖70 
Over the next several years, the New York courts became more 
assertive in upholding express contracts where Jewish women were 
being denied gittin. For example, in Waxstein v. Waxstein,
71
 the 
New York trial court emphasized the ―inherent unfairness‖ in 
allowing the husband to obtain all the advantages of the separation 
agreement, without fulfilling certain provisions, like the delivery of 
a get.
72
 Although these cases provide helpful precedent for an 
agunah, they have limited impact in that they are only applicable 
in situations where parties have expressly consented to a get 
provision in their agreement. 
While many courts have relied on couples‘ express agreements 
that have outlined the direct granting of a get, some courts have 
presumed the existence of a get when the couple was married in 
harmony with religious traditions.
73
 New Jersey first inferred this 
type of agreement in the seminal case of Minkin v. Minkin.
74
 In that 
case, the court held that requiring the husband to give his wife a 
get did not violate the Establishment Clause, reasoning that when 
                                                        
69 Id. (―Complying with [defendant‘s] agreement would not compel [him] 
to practice any religion, not even the Jewish faith to which he still admits 
adherence . . . . His appearance before the Rabbinate to answer questions and 
give evidence needed by them to make a decision is not a profession of faith. 
Specific performance herein would merely require the defendant to do what he 
voluntarily agreed to do.‖). But see Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d 694, 
695–96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 1957) (affirming the trial court‘s decision to 
deny specific performance because the contract was too vague). 
70 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 340. 
71 Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
72 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 341. Significantly, the Waxstein decision is 
limited to cases in which the husband denies a get to his wife and she has 
completed all of her responsibilities under their agreement. Id.  
73 Id. at 343. For example, courts will view ―recit[ing] a formula at the 
ceremony that the marriage was ‗in accordance with the laws of Moses and 
Israel,‘ or execut[ing] the traditional ketubah or marriage contract‖ as evidence 
of the couples‘ connection and submission to religious principles at marriage. Id.  
74 Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). In this 
case, a woman moved to require her husband to provide her with a get following 
her civil divorce and pay the costs of the Jewish divorce. Id.  
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he signed the ketubah,
75
 the husband agreed to follow the ―laws of 
Moses and Israel,‖ and therefore he was required to deliver a get to 
his wife because he alleged that she committed adultery.
76
 From a 
contract law perspective, the court found that ―[t]o compel the 
husband to secure a get would be to enforce the agreement of the 
marriage contract (ketuba[h]).‖77 The court noted that it was 
required to enforce contracts so long as the contract was not 
unconscionable, would not violate public policy,
78
 and would pass 
constitutional muster.
79
 Since this contract obligated the parties to 
engage in ―reciprocal obligations pertaining to the marriage,‖ there 
were no requirements inconsistent with public policy.
80
  
The holding in Minkin was later expanded in Burns v. Burns,
81
 
where the court instructed the husband not to issue the get himself, 
                                                        
75 Refers to a ―Jewish marriage contract.‖ Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof, 
About.com: Marriage, Ketubah, http://marriage.about.com/od/jewishmarriage 
traditions/g/ketubah.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
76 Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666. The court noted that ―the provisions and laws 
of Moses and Israel‖ require the husband to give his wife a get if he alleges his 
wife committed adultery. Id.  
77 Id. (emphasis added). The same decision was reached by an Illinois 
court. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(directing husband to deliver his wife a get).  
78  Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666. 
79 See infra Part III.  
80 Minkin, 434 A.2d at 666. Significantly, New Jersey courts have issued 
inconsistent decisions regarding get delivery. See Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing to follow Minkin, and finding that 
ordering the delivery of a get would violate the husband‘s First Amendment 
rights). 
81 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). In Burns, the husband told 
his wife that he would grant her a get in exchange for a $25,000 payment. Id. at 
439; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 344–45; Edward S. Nadel, New 
York‟s Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 55, 
65 (1993). The Burns court held that a husband is required to grant his wife a get 
when:  
(1) he unjustifiably refuses conjugal rights; (2) if the husband shows 
unworthy conduct toward his wife such that the wife cannot be 
expected to live with him as his wife; (3) if the husband‘s unjustified 
refusal to maintain her when he is in the position to do so, or could be if 
he was willing to work and earn an income; (4) if the husband is 
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but to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the Beth Din.
82
 While the 
Burns decision enhanced the court‘s authority to order a husband 
to begin the get process, the court was inaccurate in its Jewish 
terminology and interpretation of the ketubah.
83
 Courts‘ 
unfamiliarity with Jewish terms and practices has resulted in 
subsequently inconsistent holdings on this issue, and this is 
precisely why state legislatures should adopt statutes for a uniform 
solution to the agunah problem. This will enable Jewish scholars 
to monitor the legislative process, and ensure consistency with 
Jewish law. 
As the Burns decision illustrates, a serious problem with using 
contract law to require a husband to grant his wife a get is that 
courts have to create legal obligations under the ketubah, which do 
not actually exist.
84
 In the ketubah, the husband makes a variety of 
promises to his wife concerning the marriage.
85
 Notably, the 
                                                        
unfaithful to his wife, or (5) if the husband habitually assaults or insults 
her, or is the cause of unceasing quarrels, so she has no choice but to 
leave the household.  
Burns, 538 A.2d at 441. 
82 Burns, 538 A.2d at 441; see also Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 345; 
Nadel, supra note 81, at 65. Legal scholar Edward Nadel commented that  
[t]here is an important halachic distinction between cases in which a 
secular court forces a husband to deliver a get and those in which the 
court merely forces the husband to appear before a [B]eth [D]in. In the 
former cases, any resulting get would be halachically invalid as a get 
me‟useh, since the delivery of the get was coerced, and therefore the 
wife would not ultimately gain the relief she desires. In the latter cases, 
there is often no such problem, since coercion may indeed be used to 
force a recalcitrant husband to comply with the directives of a [B]eth 
[D]in that has ordered the delivery of a get.  
Id. at 67 (emphasis added).  
83 ―[T]he Burns opinion makes a number of errors concerning Jewish law—
for example, it describes a get as evidence of a divorce, and it misinterprets the 
ketubah . . . .‖ Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 345. 
84 See id.  
85 These promises include:  
(1) a declaration that he has betrothed his wife in accordance with the 
laws of Moses and Israel; (2) a promise that he will honor, support, and 
work for his spouse in accordance with the custom of Jewish husbands; 
(3) an obligation to provide food, clothing, and intimacy in accordance 
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ketubah is written in Aramaic, which makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand; most times, it is not translated into a 
language in which the couple can understand.
86
 As a result, many 
couples consider the document as an element of Jewish ritual 
practice, as opposed to a legally binding contractual agreement 
with the requisite intent, since the couples likely do not know what 
the ketubah says.
87
   
In sum, while state courts can use contract law to compel 
husbands to grant their wives a get, it is not the most ideal measure 
a state can take to deal with this problem. Divorce law is a 
―creature of statute,‖ so when the state creates legislation to 
address this problem it reduces the public‘s uncertainty concerning 
the court‘s role.88 In other words, a statute, as opposed to 
―discretionary judicial intervention,‖ provides a ―uniform solution‖ 
to the agunah problem upon which people can rely; a husband will 
be aware that he will not be offered a divorce by the state until the 
statute is followed.
89
 Therefore, a statute will better deter Jewish 
husbands from utilizing this extortive tool than would inconsistent 
applications of contract law.
90
 
                                                        
‗with universal custom‘; (4) an agreement to pay an alimony lump sum 
of 200 silver zuz in the event of divorce or death; (5) an agreement to 
pay a stipulated monetary value for property that the wife brings into 
the marriage; (6) a promise to pay an additional alimony sum in excess 
of the statutory minimum; and (7) the creation of a lien on all real or 
personal property, whether presently owned or after-acquired, to secure 
payment of all obligations under the ketubah. 
 Id. at 347.  
86 Id. at 345. In In re Marriage of Goldman, the husband testified, ―that he 
considered the ketubah to be poetry or art rather than a contract.‖ 554 N.E.2d 
1016, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 199). Rabbi Rachlis then testified that most couples 
view ―the ketubah in a symbolic rather than a literal sense.‖ Id. at 1020; accord 
Nadel, supra note 81, at 66 n.91. 
87 If this document were to be considered enforceable, a heavy burden of 
proof would be placed on the party trying to enforce the contract. Breitowitz, 
supra note 14, at 348. 
88 Feldman, supra note 29, at 163. 
89 Id. at 163–64.  
90 Id. at 164.  
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F. New York‟s “Get” Statute 
While support groups and court decisions involving contract 
law have helped many women, the agunah problem is too 
pervasive to be handled on a case by case basis, and state 
legislation, like that in New York, is necessary. In 1983, the New 
York Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law § 253, known 
as the ―get statute,‖ which denies a civil divorce to any party who 
does not remove all barriers to remarriage.
91
 The statute provides:  
No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter 
be entered unless the plaintiff shall have filed and served a 
sworn statement: (i) that, to the best of his or her 
knowledge, he or she has, prior to the entry of such final 
judgment, taken all steps solely within his or her power to 
remove all barriers to the defendant‘s remarriage following 
the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has 
waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision.
92
 
This statute was passed to provide a solution to the growing 
agunah problem in New York, where recalcitrant husbands were 
using their get power to put their wives in unequal negotiating 
positions concerning their civil divorces. New York correctly 
found that this economic coercion was a matter that needed to be 
resolved by the state.
93
 When enacting the statute, the legislature 
                                                        
91 Id. at 152.  
92 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 253(3) (McKinney 1999). New York defines a 
―barrier to remarriage‖ as ―any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition, 
of which the party required to make the verified statement is aware, that is 
imposed on a party to a marriage.‖ Id. § 253(6). The statute contains two 
provisions, which guard against false statements by attaching criminal liability 
and allowing a clergyman to counter a false affidavit by stating that the plaintiff 
has not really removed all barriers to remarriage. Id. §§ 253(8), (7). 
93 Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo stated that the  
bill was overwhelmingly adopted by the State legislature because it 
deals with a tragically unfair condition that is almost universally 
acknowledged. The requirement of a Get is used by unscrupulous 
spouses who avail themselves of our Civil Courts and simultaneously 
use their denial of a Get vindictively or as a form of economic 
coercion.  
Memorandum from New York Governor Mario Cuomo approving N.Y. DOM. 
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took extra precaution to make sure it did not mention Jewish 
religious practices, in an apparent attempt to protect the statute 
from any First Amendment violations.
94
 Unfortunately, the New 
York Legislature quickly found that there were other problems 
with the statute,
95
 specifically that ―the bill has had limited effect, 
since it is not always the plaintiff, but the defendant who is 
recalcitrant in acquiring a [g]et.‖96 The 1983 get statute only 
insisted the plaintiff remove barriers to remarriage; if the defendant 
did not counterclaim in the matrimonial action, he was exempt 
from the statute.
97
 In this situation, a Jewish wife was advised not 
to be the party to file for divorce, since, under the 1983 statute, the 
defendant husband would not be required to take all the necessary 
steps to remove barriers to remarriage.
98
 Frequently, this left the 
woman in a precarious situation with only two viable options if her 
husband did not file for the civil divorce: remain a member of an 
unhappy and unfulfilling marriage, or be stigmatized in her 
community as an agunah. 
In 1992, the Legislature responded to this problem and created 
a new get law by amending New York‘s equitable distribution 
statute, which applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant in a 
matrimonial action.
99
 The statute provides that when considering 
equitable distribution in marital dissolution, ―the court shall, where 
appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage.‖100 After 
this amendment, New York‘s courts were granted the authority to 
take into account any barriers to remarriage when considering the 
factors for dividing marital assets and those that must be 
                                                        
REL. LAW § 253 (Aug. 8, 1983) (emphasis added). 
94 ―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .‖ U.S. CONST. amend. I. See infra Part 
III (discussing constitutional issues).   
95 Zornberg, supra note 35, at 733.  
96 McQuiston, supra note 39 (quoting Andrew J. Stein, City Council 
President).  
97 Zornberg, supra note 35, at 733.  
98 See id.  
99 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. §§ 236(B)(5)(d), (B)(6)(a) (McKinney 1999). 
100 Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(h), (B)(6)(d).  
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considered in setting maintenance.
101
 Lisa Zornberg explains that 
the policy reasons at the heart of the 1992 amendment were to 
allow courts to fairly assess and divide marital assets, and ―[i]n the 
case of the agunah, whose prospects of financial security may be 
seriously impaired by her inability to remarry, the 1992 law allows 
judges to award the woman a greater percentage of the marital 
assets to compensate for this disability.‖102 Following the 1992 
amendment, New York‘s get laws have proven to be successful 
remedies for agunot within New York.
103
 Because of the success 
of New York‘s get statute and its subsequent reform, it provides a 
good model for other states also concerned with ending abuse of 
the get system among their Jewish populations. 
II. ATTEMPTED LEGISLATION  
Currently, New York is the only state to have adopted a get 
statute. However, the recent experiences of two states, Maryland 
and Florida, demonstrate the difficult tasks of balancing the 
positive remedial functions of a state-sponsored get statute with the 
underlying constitutional concerns.
104
 Since the agunot problem 
extends beyond the borders of New York, Maryland and Florida 
legislators have similarly attempted to respond to the needs of their 
constituents in this tragic situation.
105
 Maryland, a state with a 
                                                        
101 Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(d)(1)-(13), (B)(6)(a)(1)-(11). Some of these factors 
include: the duration of the marriage, the age and health of both parties, the 
income and property of each party at time of both marriage and divorce, the 
present and future earning capacity of each party, and ―any other factor which 
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‖ Id. §§ 236(B)(5)(d), 
(B)(6)(a). 
102 Zornberg, supra note 35, at 734 (emphasis added). 
103 Reports have found that ―[a]lmost simultaneously with the signing of 
the law . . . [cases] suddenly resolved themselves . . . . The mere fact that people 
knew that it was on the books caused things to be resolved.‖ Id. at 761 (quoting 
David Long). 
104 See infra Part III (discussing Constitution).  
105 Maryland‘s Senate Bill 533 was sponsored by Senators Lisa A. Gladden 
(Dist. 41), Gwendolyn Britt (Dist. 47), Jim Brochin (Dist. 42), Jennie M. 
Forehand (Dist. 17), Brian E. Frosh (Dist. 16), Rob Garagiola (Dist. 15), Nancy 
Jacobs (Dist. 34). S.B. 533, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007). Florida‘s key sponsor for the 
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significant Jewish population,
106
 has proposed get legislation five 
times, encountered constitutional hurdles, and most recently fell 
one vote short in its Senate of passing a get statute.
107
 In 2008, 
Florida, with over ten percent of the nation‘s Jewish population,108 
proposed its own version of a get statute.
109
 Even though it 
advanced further than Maryland‘s proposed legislation, the Florida 
bill fell short of becoming law at the House of Delegates stage.
110
  
Unfortunately, because these recent legislative attempts have been 
unsuccessful, the agunah problem remains prevalent in both 
Maryland and Florida, and requires an innovative solution, built 
upon the shortcomings of the previous attempts.
111
 This section 
will outline each state‘s legislative history in the order in which 
they were proposed; Maryland‘s failed get statute began to 
percolate on the legislative floor in 1997,
112
 while the Florida 
initiative began in 2007.
113
   
                                                        
legislation was Senator David Aronberg, who introduced the bill on the Senate 
floor. S.B. 96, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007). 
106 Maryland‘s Jewish population makes up 4.2 percent of Maryland‘s total 
population and 3.65 percent of the total U.S. Jewish population. AMERICAN 
JEWISH YEAR BOOK (David Singer & Lawrence Grossman eds., vol. 106, 2006) 
[hereinafter JEWISH YEAR BOOK]. 
107 Because the ―[l]egislation needs a majority vote to pass,‖ the third 
reading failed despite a vote of twenty-two yays to twenty-two nays. E-mail 
from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator Lisa A. Gladden 
to author. (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author). 
108 Florida‘s Jewish population makes up 3.7 percent of Florida‘s total 
population and 10.1 percent of the nation‘s total Jewish Population. JEWISH 
YEAR BOOK, supra note 106. 
109 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SESSION 2008, HISTORY OF SENATE 
BILLS, SB 96, at 36, available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/ 
2008/citator/final/senhist.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) [hereinafter HISTORY 
OF SB 96]. 
110 Id.  
111 Reliable statistics on the number of agunot are not available, possibly 
because of the private nature of the matter. Zornberg, supra note 35, at 718. 
However, the large number of organizations dedicated to agunot serves as a 
good indication of the scope of the problem. Id. Still, the primary source of data 
remains the fact that many people in the Orthodox community have provided 
anecdotal evidence of the problem. Id.  
112 See DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FISCAL 
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A. Maryland  
In the last decade, Maryland has made significant attempts to 
follow New York‘s lead and enact get legislation to deal with non-
compliant husbands who will not grant their wives a get. With 
approximately 3.65 percent of the country‘s Jewish population 
living in Maryland, the state has had experience with Jewish 
divorces and, consequently, has become aware of the problems of 
agunot.
114
 In one highly publicized case, Sarah Rosenbloom, a 
Maryland resident who civilly divorced her husband Sam in 1999, 
is still considered married in the eyes of the Jewish faith because 
her husband refuses to give her a get.
115
 In an attempt to help 
Sarah, groups like the Jewish Coalition Against Domestic Abuse 
(JCADA) and Organization for the Resolution of Agunot (ORA) 
have organized protests outside Sarah‘s husband‘s house chanting 
―Sam Rosenbloom, unchain your wife‖ and ―Free Your Wife, Free 
Your Soul.‖116 Barbara Zackheim, JCADA President, has been 
quoted as saying that the get is ―the last vestige of abuse that a 
husband can perpetrate on his wife. . . . [I]t‘s incumbent on the 
Jewish community to help.‖117 Unfortunately, these efforts have 
been unsuccessful and the agunah problem remains prevalent in 
Maryland.
118
 
In response to the situation, Maryland legislators began to 
propose legislation in the late 1990s.
119
 Their yearly efforts were 
                                                        
AND POLICY NOTE, SB 533 (2007), available at http://senate.state.md. 
us/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0003/sb0533.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter 
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS].  
113 HISTORY OF SB 96, supra note 109, at 36. 
114 JEWISH YEAR BOOK, supra note 106; DALE E. JONES ET AL., RELIGIOUS 
CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: AN 
ENUMERATION BY REGION, STATE AND COUNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED 
FOR 149 RELGIOIUS BODIES (Glenmary Research Center 2002) [hereinafter 
RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS]. 
115 Michelle Boorstein, Ancient Divorce Laws‟ Modern Quandary, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at C01; see also Awareness Center, supra note 62. 
116 Awareness Center, supra note 62. 
117 Id. (quoting Barbara Zackheim, JCADA President).  
118 See supra note 111.  
119 The 2000 proposed legislation was favored over the 1999 version 
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unsuccessful from 1997 to 2000, and again, most recently, in 
February 2007.
120
 The 2007 bill, ―Removal of Religious Barriers to 
Remarriage Act,‖ was based on the 1983 New York statute and 
required ―removal of religious barriers to remarriage‖ before a 
civil divorce would be entered for either party.
121
 The bill sought to 
―address a problem for people who obtain a civil divorce, but still 
face religious barriers to remarriage if the party wishes to remarry 
within the faith.‖122 It was estimated that the financial implications 
of this particular bill were minimal, which suggests that funding 
issues would not hamper its passage in the legislature.
123
  
This law, if enacted, would have contained important 
limitations in its effect on religious groups and would not have  
[a]uthorize[d] a court to order a party to remove a religious 
barrier to remarriage; inhibit or restrain an individual from 
taking part in ecclesiastical tribunal proceedings for a 
decree of matrimonial nullity or dissolution according to 
religious tenets; or inhibit or restrain a religious body from 
                                                        
because the 1999 version ―might affect uncontested divorces, and ones where 
religious divorce would not be an issue.‖ Divorce Reform Page, Legislation to 
Help Agunot—―Chained Women,‖ http://www.divorcereform.org/agunot.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009).   
120 See DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112, at 3; Ovetta 
Wiggins, Senate, Fearing an Entanglement of Church and State, Kills Divorce 
Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701126.html; Boorstein, supra 
note 115.   
121 DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS, supra note 112, at 1–2. 
122 Id. at 2.  
123 The Department of Legislative Services estimated that the proposed 
statute would require some increase in general funds of the state due to the 
penalty provision. However, because ―[t]he number of people convicted of this 
proposed crime is expected to be minimal,‖ there would be no real increase in 
funds at all. The proposed statute states that ―[a] violator is guilty of the 
misdemeanor of perjury and is subject to imprisonment for up to 10 years.  The 
State may institute a prosecution for this misdemeanor at any time.‖ All other 
requirements of the bill could be covered through resources the state already 
possessed. DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FISCAL 
AND POLICY NOTE, HB 324 1–3 (2007), available at http://mlis.state.md.us 
/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0004/hb0324.pdf. 
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adhering to its ecclesiastical tenets governing marriage.
124
 
Moreover, rather than affirmatively mandating that the judicial 
system require the husband to give a get, the bill would have 
ordered the presiding judge to withhold the civil divorce unless 
religious barriers were removed, which only the husband could 
authorize. Additionally, the proposed bill established boundaries 
upon the court so as not to enhance its jurisdiction into religious 
rituals and practices. These limitations are significant in light of 
the First Amendment controversy, and serve to preserve the 
constantly-shifting barrier between church and state.
125
 
This most recent attempt at legislation included a spirited 
debate between Maryland representatives concerning both the 
constitutionality of the bill and women‘s rights issues.126 Senator 
Lisa Gladden, the bill‘s sponsor, ―argued that the measure was not 
about religion but ‗about fairness. It‘s a women‘s rights issue.‘‖127 
Agreeing with Senator Gladden, The Women‘s Law Center wrote 
in support of the bill because it ―removes one tool of power and 
control commonly used in abusive relationships.‖128 Other 
organizations from all over the state, as well as Maryland‘s 
Assistant Attorney General, wrote letters of support to try to 
persuade the legislature that the bill would be highly beneficial and 
would not violate any constitutional rights.
129
 The proponents of 
                                                        
124 Id. at 2.  
125 See discussion of constitutional issues, infra Part III. 
126 Wiggins, supra note 120.  
127 Id. (quoting Senator Lisa Gladden). 
128 Letter from The Women‘s Law Center of Maryland, Inc., to Judicial 
Hearings Committee (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative 
Services).   
129 Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to Delegate 
Samuel I. Rosenberg (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative 
Services); Letter from Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America to 
Chairman Brian E. Frosh (Feb. 28, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative 
Services); Letter from The Greater Washington Jewish Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence to House Judicial Committee and Senate Judicial 
Proceedings (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter 
from Maryland Jewish Alliance to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 
22, 2007) (on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from The 
Rabbinical Council to Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 21, 2007) 
WEXLER_6-5-09 6/6/2009  1:17 PM 
 GOTTA GET A GET 757 
the bill hoped that recent highly publicized cases, like Sarah 
Rosenbloom‘s, would illuminate the problem more clearly for the 
legislature and help accelerate the bill‘s passage.130 However, 
opponents of the bill, such as Senator Rona E. Kramer, argued that 
―the state should not legislate religious doctrine,‖ which she 
claimed this divorce bill would largely mandate.
131
 Some 
legislators were undecided and clearly conflicted, including 
Delegate Luiz R. S. Simmons, who found the witnesses at the 
legislative hearings to be ―very eloquent;‖ however, he also 
appreciated the possible constitutional entanglements, where he 
noted that if the bill ―doesn‘t breach the barrier [of the First 
Amendment], then it toes right up to it and whistles.‖132  
With these opinions in mind, it became unclear how the 
legislature would vote. The bill cleared the Senate Judiciary 
Proceedings Committee before the legislators voted a first time; 
the first vote passed thirty-five to ten.
133
 In the second vote, 
however, the bill failed on the floor at a stalemate, each side 
garnering twenty-two votes.
134
 While the bill was expected to pass 
through the Senate, several votes were changed at the last 
minute.
135
 Due to these last minute changes, the bill did not have a 
                                                        
(on file with Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from Maryland Catholic 
Conference to Delegate Samuel I. Rosenberg (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with 
Maryland Legislative Services); Letter from The Women‘s Law Center of 
Maryland, Inc., to Judicial Hearings Committee (Feb. 22, 2007) (on file with 
Maryland Legislative Services).   
130 Caryn Tamber, Maryland Lawmakers Debate Constitutionality of 
„Chained Wives‟ Bill, BALT. DAILY RECORD, Feb. 23, 2007.   
131 Total Divorce, Maryland Divorce Legislation for Orthodox Jews Passes 
Senate‟s Initial Vote, http://blog.totaldivorce.com/2007/03/15/maryland-divorce-
legislation-for-orthodox-jews-passes-senates-initial-vote/ (last visited Jan. 26, 
2009) (citing Rona E. Kramer). 
132 Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Delegate Luiz R. S. Simmons). 
133 E-mail from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator 
Lisa A. Gladden, to author (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author).  
134 Because a majority of votes are needed for passage, the twenty-two to 
twenty-two vote resulted in the bill‘s failure. Wiggins, supra note 120.  
135 E-mail from Jacqueline M. Greenfield, Constituent Liaison to Senator 
Lisa A. Gladden, to author (Feb. 5, 2009) (on file with author). ―We thought 
there would be no problem passing it at the third reading.‖ Id.  
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chance to go to the House of Delegates and has not re-surfaced. 
While the proposed Maryland get statute was not passed in this last 
attempt, the bill had wide and strong support that suggests it would 
have enough support to be voted into law if it were proposed again 
in a modified form that better addressed the constitutional 
concerns.  
B. Florida  
Last year, Florida legislators, like those in Maryland, proposed 
get legislation that failed to become law.
136
 Senator David 
Aronberg plans to sponsor the bill again; however, the House 
sponsor from 2007 is no longer available so the Senator is looking 
for a new co-sponsor.
137
 Florida, like New York and Maryland, is a 
well-populated Jewish state; its constituency comprises more than 
10 percent of the country‘s Jewish population.138 Senator Aronberg 
first sponsored the bill after he was approached by Mrs. Abisror, a 
constituent who has not been able to receive a get from her 
husband, Dr. David Abisror, for over ten years.
139
 Organizations 
like ORA attempted to help Mrs. Abisror by organizing, rallying 
and shouting ―Free your wife‖ outside Dr. Abisror‘s office, but 
nothing has helped.
140
 Women‘s International Zionist 
Organization‘s (WIZO) executive director, Joan Peppard 
Winograd, explained that a get statute would aid women
141
 like Dr. 
Abisror‘s wife to receive a complete divorce and be unburdened by 
her unfortunate lack of negotiating stature due to her gender. 
The legislation that Senator Aronberg and others in Florida 
now seek to propose is similar to the 1992 amendment to New 
York‘s equitable distribution laws. Currently, Florida permits 
                                                        
136 HISTORY OF SB 96, supra note 109.  
137 Telephone Interview with Kristen Pesicek, Legislative Assistant to 
Senator Dave Aronberg (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pesicek].  
138 JEWISH YEAR BOOK, supra note 106.  
139 Pesicek, supra note 137; see also Lisa J. Huriash, Rally Supports 
Woman Seeking Jewish Divorce, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2007, 
available at http://www.giveheraget.com/media.htm. 
140 Huriash, supra note 139.  
141 Id.  
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courts to consider a list of factors in determining the equitable 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities.
142
 In a 1997 case, 
Bloch v. Bloch, the Florida District Court of Appeals ―implicitly 
held‖ that the court could take barriers to remarriage into account 
when deciding and distributing assets and liabilities.
143
 Florida‘s 
proposed legislation, if passed, would codify the Bloch decision 
into legislation upon which courts throughout the state could rely.  
Florida‘s proposed amendment to the equitable distribution 
laws would also add a provision that would include ―the failure or 
refusal of one spouse to remove a barrier to remarriage of the other 
spouse‖ as another factor for judges to use in evaluating 
matrimonial cases.
144
 The legislation would have no fiscal impact 
in taxes or upon the government sector,
145
 and would provide a 
uniform legal remedy to Florida‘s agunah problem.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. Establishment Clause  
Critics of the proposed Maryland and Florida get legislation 
argue that those laws would violate the Establishment Clause of 
the United States‘ Constitution, which states: ―Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .‖146 At 
                                                        
142 Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets and Liabilities, FLA. STAT. 
§ 61.075(1)(a)-(j) (1997). Section (1)(j) allows a Florida court to take into 
account ―[a]ny other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the 
parties.‖ Id. § 61.075(1)(j). This final provision allows the court to use judicial 
discretion in dividing property. 
143 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6; Bloch v. Bloch, 688 So. 2d 945, 
946–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
144 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 7. ―Barrier to remarriage‖ is defined as 
―any religious, secular or conscientious restraint or inhibition of which the 
spouse is aware, which is imposed on the other spouse, and which exists by 
reason of the spouse‘s commission or withholding of any voluntary act.‖ Id. at 6.  
145 Id. at 8. 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Maryland bill provides 
that a party who files a complaint or countercomplaint for an absolute 
divorce or annulment must file, on request of the other party, an 
affidavit stating that the affiant has taken all steps solely within the 
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the heart of these criticisms is the notion that by entangling the 
civil and religious divorce procedures in state courts, the 
legislation is tantamount to state-established religion, which 
inevitably operates to the detriment of other faiths, religious 
practices and to those who do not believe in established religion.
147
 
However, after scrutinizing this issue in the context of the Supreme 
Court‘s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is clear that such 
criticisms are misplaced. 
Although the Court has yet to rule on this precise constitutional 
quandary, it developed a three-prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman
148
 
to evaluate possible First Amendment violations, vis-à-vis the 
Establishment Clause. The test determines the degree and type of 
connection between government and religion. To satisfy the test: 1) 
there must be a secular purpose for the legislation (purpose prong); 
2) there must be a principal or primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion (effects prong); and 3) the statute cannot 
―foster an excessive government entanglement with religion‖ 
(entanglement prong).
149
 The Lemon test‘s demanding criteria have 
been somewhat controversial;
150
 however, a bill that can meet 
                                                        
affiant‘s control to remove all religious barriers to remarriage by the 
other party. If such an affidavit is requested, the court may not enter a 
decree for an absolute divorce or annulment until the affidavit is filed. 
DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112. The Florida bill states that 
judges could consider ―the failure or refusal of one spouse to remove a barrier to 
remarriage of the other spouse‖ as another factor in evaluating matrimonial 
cases. FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 7. 
147 See generally Feldman, supra note 29, at 157; Eric Fingerhut, Maryland 
Holds Hearing on „Get Law‟, WASH. JEWISH WEEK ONLINE EDITION, Feb. 28, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtonjewishweek.com/main.asp?SectionID 
=4&SubSectionID=4&ArticleID=6773&TM=39366; Nathaniel Popper, Divorce 
Bill Leaves Feminists and Ultra-Orthodox in Bed Together, FORWARD, Feb. 2, 
2007, available at http://www.forward.com/artciles/10003/; Wiggins, supra note 
120.  
148 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
149 Id.  
150 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court noted that due to the wide array 
of possible Establishment Clause conflicts, courts have been reluctant to broadly 
apply the Lemon test as a universal prism through which to interpret these 
issues. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86 (2005) (noting that 
the Lemon test was not particularly applicable to the erection of a ―passive‖ Ten 
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Lemon‘s three prongs will likely satisfy any other Establishment 
test.
151
  
1. Purpose Prong 
Critics, like Maryland‘s Senator Jamie Raskin, argue that the 
proposed get legislation
152
 does not satisfy the first prong of the 
Lemon test, which requires legislation to have a secular purpose, 
because ―the entire purpose of this bill is religious . . . .‖153 
Additionally, opponents argue that New York‘s stated primary 
purpose in enacting legislation was to ―remedy the plight of the 
agunah‖ and that her ―dilemma is created by her own religious 
convictions.‖154  
However, courts have consistently stipulated that Lemon‘s first 
prong is ―a fairly low hurdle‖ where any ―clearly secular purpose‖ 
will suffice.
155
 Only in rare circumstances has legislation or 
                                                        
Commandments Monument on the Capitol grounds, where Justice William 
Rehnquist said, ―[W]e noted that the factors in Lemon serve as ‗no more than 
helpful signposts.‘‖) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). 
Furthermore, the Court, in its overview of particularly recent judicial precedent 
on this matter, noted that a great deal of cases have not applied the Lemon test at 
all. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Others have only applied the 
Lemon test after noticing the practice at issue failed one of the other 
Establishment Clause tests. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685–86. 
151 Professor Breitowitz properly defended the get statute in the context of 
the Lemon test, while presupposing that by passing the three prongs of the 
Lemon test the statute would ultimately survive the First Amendment‘s 
Establishment Clause bar. He stated:  
To the extent the get law furthers state interests of a secular nature and 
does not endorse or advance the cause of religion, but simply levels the 
playing field by removing a disability that is peculiar to a particular 
religious class, the statute passes muster not only to Lemon but under 
any probable alternative test that the Supreme Court is likely to adopt.  
Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 419. 
152 Including both New York § 253 and the proposed Maryland statute.  
153 Wiggins, supra note 120 (quoting Senator Jamie Raskin).  
154 Feldman, supra note 29, at 156.   
155 Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2001); see McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (finding that there was a secular purpose in 
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governmental action been invalidated on the ground that a secular 
purpose was lacking.
156
 In such cases, the conduct was ―motivated 
wholly [by] religious considerations.‖157 According to Marc 
Feldman, the get statute‘s secular purpose is to ―remove[] a 
husband‘s ability to hold his wife hostage to his 
demands . . .[p]reventing extortion or infliction of emotional 
distress . . . .‖158 Furthermore, a ―state has a legitimate secular 
interest‖ in guaranteeing that its laws maintain ―integrity and 
efficacy‖ in its courts; therefore, the policies underlying the get 
laws are to do away with dead marriages and to allow parties to 
―have the freedom to rebuild their lives anew.‖159  
As Sarah Rosenbloom, a Maryland resident and agunah, 
explained, she ―just want[ed] to live . . . [in] freedom . . . [and not 
to] be a caged bird anymore.‖160 When barriers to remarriage are 
sustained, the divorce laws of a state are ―frustrate[d],‖ as is the 
―integrity of the judicial system.‖161 Get legislation is aimed at 
giving wives the same rights as husbands and removing women 
from a ―hostage situation‖ where husbands have the power to deny 
a get and abuse their wives.
162
 
Maryland‘s proposed get legislation has several additional 
secular purposes.
163
 For instance, the legislation promotes ―new 
family formation by removing voluntarily maintained barriers to 
remarriage.‖164 Maryland advocates have emphasized that one of 
the purposes of civil divorces is to allow parties to remarry; this 
                                                        
Closing laws on Sundays). 
156 See Brown, 258 F.3d at 276. 
157 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (emphasis added). 
158 Feldman, supra note 29, at 157.  
159 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 385. 
160 Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Sarah Rosenbloom).  
161 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 385. 
162 Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Cynthia Ohana).  
163 For similar arguments to those made throughout Part III, see Letter from 
Kathryn M. Rowe, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, to Samuel I. 
Rosenberg, Bill Sponsor, Maryland Delegate (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with 
Maryland Legislative Services) [hereinafter Rowe].  
164 Id. at 2. 
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legislation would act in concert with that purpose.
165
 Furthermore, 
the proposed legislation would require parties seeking a divorce to 
do so fairly and with ―clean hands,‖166 so that ―[h]e who seeks 
equity, must do equity.‖167 Ultimately, the legislation will protect 
women‘s rights and avoid coercion168 and spousal abuse in 
negotiations related to divorce, as has been the response to the 
New York legislation.  
Similar to Maryland, Florida officials have also stated that a 
secular purpose of passing their get legislation is to promote the 
―right to marry (or remarry).‖169 Florida proponents also suggest 
that the proposed get statute encourages fair distribution of assets, 
as in the situation of ―a wife whose future income is limited by the 
inability to remarry a larger amount.‖170 Lastly, the Florida bill was 
written in an impartial fashion to avoid constitutional problems.
171
 
Both the Maryland and Florida bills, then, would pass the first 
prong of the Lemon test because they both have valid secular 
purposes.
172
  
2. Effects Prong 
Under the Lemon test‘s second prong, government conduct or 
legislation is valid if it ―neither advances nor inhibits religion.‖173 
Critics to get laws argue that they ―incorporate[] Jewish divorce 
law into state law, and thus advance[] the Jewish religion by 
facilitating remarriage of observant Jews . . . [and also that] the 
mere appearance of the joint exercise of judicial authority by 
church and state provide[] symbolic endorsement of the Jewish 
                                                        
165 See id.  
166 Id. (quoting Schneider v. Schneider, 644 A.2d 510, 514 (Md. 1994)). 
167 Id. (quoting Merryman v. Bremmer, 241 A.2d 558, 565 (Md. 1968)).  
168 Id.  
169 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 5.   
170 Id.  
171 Id. Florida defined ―‗barrier[s] to remarriage‘ to include ‗without 
limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition.‘‖ Id.  
172 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
173 Id. at 612.  
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religion to the detriment of others.‖174 Although it is true that such 
legislation will have a direct impact on get deliveries among 
Jewish couples, the Supreme Court has stated that ―[c]omparisons 
of the relative benefits to religion of different forms of 
governmental support are elusive and difficult to make.‖175 
Additionally, the Court has upheld a variety of endorsements and 
benefits to religion and stated that they did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.
176
 Furthermore, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
Justice O‘Connor explained that government conduct should be 
invalidated if it sends ―a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.‖177 Here, the law does not 
fail Justice O‘Connor‘s standard because it does not send a 
message that Jews are a favored class of people. It merely seeks to 
eliminate a problem for which only observant female Jews suffer 
and are victimized into a subordinate position where they cannot 
remarry within their faith.
178
  
In analyzing the Maryland bill, a court should find that the 
primary or principal effect of the proposed bill is not to further 
religion, but rather to further the stated secular purposes.
179
 There 
is no governmental endorsement of religion because the proposed 
legislation contains no explicit mention of any Jewish custom or 
practice; specifically, neither the get nor agunah is mentioned.
180
 
While the statute was formulated to combat coercion and extortion 
afflicting Jewish women, ―it is not drafted so as to be limited to 
                                                        
174 Feldman, supra note 29, at 157. 
175 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). 
176 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 236 (1968) (holding that 
the purchase of textbooks, bought through state tax funds and supplied to 
students attending religious schools, is valid because the law had a relevant 
benefit to all children in school); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(holding that a statute reimbursing parents for bus fares to their children‘s 
religious schools passes constitutional muster). 
177 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
178 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
179 See Rowe, supra note 163, at 2.  
180 Id.  
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that religious group and does not incorporate into civil law any 
aspect of Jewish religious practice.‖181 The legislation has a 
desired long-term effect to encourage remarriage, which is a 
secular purpose, and although the short-term effect of avoiding 
coercive civil divorce proceedings is religious in character, this 
should not invalidate its predominantly secular effect.
182
 
The counterargument to Lemon‘s second prong is that the 
proposed legislation would compel a husband to complete a 
religious act, i.e., deliver a get, before a civil divorce is entered.
183
 
Critics argue that ―the delivery of a [g]et is clearly a religious act 
because the sole justification for it is attached to the Jewish 
religion and that ‗there is no secular justification for such a 
[religious] divorce since a civil divorce legally terminates the 
marriage.‘‖184  
There is a question, however, as to whether the get even 
constitutes a religious act.
185
 The get can be construed as a non-
                                                        
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 5.  
184 Id. at 4 (quoting Lawrence C. Marshall, The Religion Clauses and 
Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and Constitutional 
Separations, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 204, 219 (1985) (emphasis added)). 
185 Id. at 5–6. Litigation over contract law (see discussion infra Part I) 
sheds further light on the judicial approach to the Establishment Clause 
controversy with respect to whether the get is in fact a religious act. In Minkin v. 
Minkin, the court, sua sponte, heard testimony from several different rabbis to 
ascertain whether delivering a get should be considered a ―religious act.‖ See 
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667–68 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) 
(emphasis added).  
 Rabbi Macy Gordon testified that the get is the ―severance of a contractual 
relationship between two parties,‖ and, therefore, ordering delivery of a get 
would not entangle the court with religion. Id. at 667. Rabbi Judah Washer 
agreed that the get is a civil document that makes no mention of God and does 
not require ―religious feelings of people, but is only concerned with the right of 
the wife to remarry.‖ Id. Rabbi Menahem Meier and Rabbi Richard Kurtz 
testified that the get deals with the relationship between man and man and not 
God and man, and therefore it is civil and not religious in nature. Id. at 668. 
Under this line of reasoning, the court concluded that it was not infringing on 
the husband‘s constitutional rights by ordering a get and the court ordered Mr. 
Minkin to do so. See id. at 667. 
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religious act because ―it does not involve worship or the profession 
of faith, a husband who has renounced Judaism can obtain a [g]et, 
and appointed representatives can actually obtain the [g]et on 
behalf of the husband.‖186 If in fact the get does not constitute a 
religious act, the proposed equitable distribution laws and get 
statute would not have the principal or primary effect of advancing 
religion. The husband would thus not be engaging in a religious 
activity, and any religious effect would be indirect or incidental. 
Under these circumstances, the get bills would pass the Lemon 
test‘s second prong.187 
3. Entanglement Prong 
Under the Lemon test‘s third prong, government conduct is 
valid if it does not ―foster an impermissible degree of 
entanglement‖ with religion.188 Maryland Senator Jamie Raskin, as 
well as other critics, argued that the bill ―does entangle the state 
with religion.‖189 Further, Maryland residents expressed concern 
that Maryland ―would [have to] entertain detailed and extensive 
discussions of religious doctrine in a civil matter . . . .‖190 
However, the Supreme Court has continuously interpreted this 
element not to require complete separation of church and state, 
since some governmental interaction with religion or religious 
organizations is inevitable and may in some cases be necessary.
191
 
The Court‘s interpretation finds entanglement to be a question ―of 
kind and degree,‖ and for invalidation there must be excessive 
entanglement between the government‘s conduct and religion or a 
religious organization.
192
  
                                                        
186 Id. (citing Zornberg, supra note 35, at 74; Marshall, supra note 185, at 
218).  
187 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
188 Id. at 612.  
189 Wiggins, supra note 120 (quoting Senator Jamie Raskin) (emphasis 
added). 
190 Tamber, supra note 130 (quoting Tim Faith). 
191 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. 
192 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
615 (holding that the direct government aid for teachers‘ salaries and textbooks 
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Nathan Lewin, a Washington D.C. lawyer, explained that ―the 
bill is constitutional because it does not force anyone to ‗profess a 
belief‘ or commit a ‗religious act,‘ only take ‗objective secular 
steps‘ such as signing a document affirming any barriers to 
remarriage have been eliminated.‖193 Furthermore, Maryland‘s 
proposed legislation was in fact ―drafted to avoid excessive 
entanglement.‖194 The parties to the litigation decide whether to 
require an affidavit stating that the get was delivered. When it is 
required, the court need not involve itself in religious matters, 
rather it only needs to record whether the affidavit was filed and 
consider any evidence if there was a ―knowingly false 
statement.‖195 Justifiably, Maryland‘s Assistant Attorney General, 
Kathryn Rowe, found these limited responsibilities far short of 
―excessive entanglement.‖196 However, assuming arguendo that 
the legislation does run into First Amendment problems, Ms. Rowe 
contends that ―it would likely be upheld if challenged.‖197 
Florida‘s proposed get law is also likely to pass Lemon‘s third 
prong because the proposed statute only requires the court to serve 
as a document checker in an effort to determine whether the get 
was granted.
198
 This does not overly entangle government with 
religion because the ―determination is made by the sworn 
statements of the plaintiff and the officiating cleric.‖199 While the 
bill analysis, performed by the Florida judiciary committee, shows 
some hesitance, it notes that the proposed get statute has survived 
judicial scrutiny.
200
 To conclude, while the Lemon test‘s three 
                                                        
in religious schools resulted in an excessive entanglement). 
193 Fingerhut, supra note 147 (quoting Nathan Lewin). 
194 Rowe, supra note 163, at 3. 
195 Id.  
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 1. In the only constitutional challenge to the New York get statute, 
the appellate court found the lower court should not have entertained the 
husband‘s motion that Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(h) was 
unconstitutional because upon the husband‘s filing, the wife waived all of her 
rights under the get statute, making the issue moot. Becher v. Becher, 245 
A.D.2d 408, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).  
198 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. See also Becher, 245 A.D.2d at 409.  
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prongs present demanding criteria, attacks on the constitutionality 
of proposed get laws under the Establishment Clause will likely 
fail. 
B. Free Exercise Clause  
Critics also argue that get legislation would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which states that 
―Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion].‖201 The Free Exercise Clause ―affirmatively mandates 
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids 
hostility toward any.‖202A violation under the Free Exercise Clause 
takes place when ―government action interferes with a sincere 
religious belief.‖203 Free Exercise violations include when  
(1) the state forces an individual to do that which his 
religion prohibits or discourages; (2) the state prevents an 
individual from doing that which his religion requires or 
encourages; (3) the state makes religious observance more 
difficult or expensive; or (4) the state forces an individual 
to do something ‗religious‘ that he wishes not to do, 
although his opposition is not necessarily based on his 
religious beliefs.
204
 
The Supreme Court uses the ―highest level of scrutiny‖ for 
Free Exercise cases, employing the ―compelling interest‖ test to 
make constitutional determinations.
205
 Under this test, the 
government has the burden to show that its conduct or legislation 
                                                        
201 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
202 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
203 Jamie Alan Aycock, Contracting Out of the Culture Wars: How the Law 
Should Enforce and Communities of Faith Should Encourage More Enduring 
Marital Commitments, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 231, 270–71 (2006). 
204 Marshall, supra note 185, at 214.  
205 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court reduced the standard of review in 
religious freedom cases to a reasonableness standard. However, the Court 
limited this new standard to situations involving religiously neutral laws. Id. The 
proposed get laws address the agunah problem and thus the Smith standard does 
not apply.  
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does not impose ―a significant burden upon a person‘s free 
exercise of religion‖ and that there is in fact a compelling state 
interest.
206
 
Critics of the get law argue that ―[b]y conditioning the grant of 
a civil remedy on the performance of a religious ceremony, the 
statute arguably infringes the free exercise rights of the otherwise 
unwilling spouse.‖207 In other words, critics argue that the 
proposed legislation essentially forces a husband to deliver a get to 
his wife, or else receive an inequitable distribution of property 
during the civil divorce proceedings. Thus, it could violate the Free 
Exercise Clause because the laws operate regardless of the 
husband‘s objections to giving a get, and because the husband is 
pushed to engage in activities he does not want to do.  
Ardent supporters of the proposed get laws, however, contend 
that get legislation does not raise Free Exercise problems because 
it does not force couples to do, or not do, anything. Professor 
Breitowitz explains that under New York‘s get legislation, the 
court does not directly command the husband to do anything; ―it 
simply conditions obtaining relief on the removal of barriers.‖208 If 
a husband chooses not to remove barriers to remarriage, there are 
no additional burdens placed upon him; rather, he is left in the 
same position and maintains ―the status quo.‖209 
In Maryland, the proposed get legislation would not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause because it does not force a person to join or 
engage in a religious practice that he has ―not already accepted 
voluntarily.‖210 When a husband delivers his wife a get, there are 
no ―professions of faith nor devotional acts.‖211 The text of the get 
does not make any mention of God, but rather states that the 
husband is announcing to the world that this woman is able to 
                                                        
206 Aycock, supra note 203, at 271. 
207 Breitowitz, supra note 14, at 394. 
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 Rowe, supra note 163, at 3.  
211 Id. (quoting Tanina Rostain, Note, Permissible Accommodations of 
Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1168 
(1987)). 
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remarry in the Jewish community.
212
 Thus, Maryland‘s proposed 
legislation would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
The constitutional analytical framework for Florida‘s bill asks 
whether the get laws ―force a husband to commit an act despite his 
religious objection and therefore place a substantial burden on the 
husband‘s religious conduct.‖213 The question of Free Exercise 
turns on whether the get is in fact a religious act.
214
  On one hand, 
jurists and scholars have argued that there is no ―secular 
justification‖ because a couple does not need a get in order to 
obtain a civil divorce.
215
 Such a couple‘s marriage would 
effectively cease to exist under state law after obtaining a civil 
divorce.
216
 On the other hand, the get does not require any actual 
religious devotion, or professing one‘s religious faith. For instance, 
―a husband who has renounced Judaism can obtain a Get, and 
appointed representatives can actually obtain the Get on behalf of 
the husband.‖217  
While the get statutes in both Maryland and Florida do raise 
some potential constitutional issues because they would be enacted 
to remedy an arguably religious concern, they are likely to be 
upheld, if challenged, following the New York model.   
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR MARYLAND AND FLORIDA 
CONCERNING THE GET LEGISLATION 
The proposed get statutes in Maryland and Florida did not fail 
because people were opposed to the fundamental premise of the 
statute, but due to political pitfalls that can be avoided in the 
future.
218
 By avoiding these pitfalls, proponents of the get statutes 
                                                        
212 Rostain, supra note 211, at 1168; Rowe, supra note 163, at 3. 
213 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 4 (citing Nadel, supra note 81, at 95; 
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 742).  
214 See supra Part III.A.  
215 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 4 (quoting Marshall, supra note 185, at 
219). 
216 Id.  
217 Id. (emphasis added). See also Marshall, supra note 185, at 218; 
Zornberg, supra note 35, at 741. 
218 Senator Aronberg‘s office explained that the get statute failed to pass in 
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can take steps to assure each bill‘s successful passage into law.  
First, it almost goes without saying that an uncontroversial title 
is a good start. In Maryland, the 2007 get bill was initially titled, 
―Removal of Religious Barriers to Remarriage.‖219 The get 
statute‘s purpose already raises constitutional concerns; therefore, 
including the word ―religious‖ in the title invites obvious critique 
from opponents. A get bill‘s title should remain religiously neutral; 
any future bill should either remove the word ―religious‖ or create 
another title. In New York, for example, the statute is called, 
―Removal of Barriers to Remarriage,‖220 excluding the ―religious‖ 
title and connotation.  
Second, in framing the issue within the legal context, the 
statute‘s flexibility in providing the wife with her fair share of the 
assets should be considered a paramount goal. Even though New 
York uses the equitable distribution model, alimony is friendlier to 
all parties involved because it makes the amount of alimony 
essentially contingent on whether the wife receives a get. Unlike 
equitable distribution, which is determined at one instant by the 
court and is thereafter unchanged, alimony has the elastic 
capability to be adjusted over time.
221
 In this situation, a judge can 
amend the alimony requirements after a get is obtained. This 
benefits all parties involved: the woman benefits because receiving 
the get inevitably frees her of the agunah problem as it allows her 
to remarry within her faith, while the former husband benefits by 
having the alimony reduced when he provides the woman with the 
get.  
By having the proposed get statute involve alimony as the ideal 
                                                        
2008 for ―political reasons‖ that were not in any way connected to the proposed 
legislation. The legislation is said to have ―sailed‖ through the Senate and while 
the statute‘s advocates in the Senate were ready to speak, they were told there 
was no need because there was already so much support for the legislation. 
Pesicek, supra note 137. See also supra Part II.A.  
219 DEP‘T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., supra note 112 (emphasis added). The 
Senate Judicial Proceedings agreed that this title was inappropriate and amended 
the title to ―Removal of Barriers to Remarriage‖ before the second vote. Floor 
Report, Senate Bill 533, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.   
220 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1983). 
221 Bay Hill Area Law Firm, Family Law, http://www.lawgrp.net/ 
family_law.html. (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Bay Hill]. 
WEXLER_6-5-09 6/6/2009  1:17 PM 
772 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
tool for marital asset distribution, it also allows the judge to 
alleviate the financial burdens of post-divorce maintenance on the 
husband after he performs his civic and religious duties vis-à-vis 
the delivery of the get. Keeping in mind the constitutional pitfalls 
of punishing American citizens for the failure to perform religious 
duties, this statute treads the fine line of the First Amendment by 
incentivizing get deliverance, thereby promoting ideals of 
egalitarianism and an extortion-free atmosphere post-marriage.  
To illustrate the deficiencies of using equitable distribution, it 
is helpful to briefly view Florida‘s most recent failed attempt to 
pass get legislation. Florida proposed that when a spouse fails to 
remove a barrier to remarriage for the other spouse, the court may 
use this obstacle in determining equitable distribution of marital 
assets.
222
 In Florida, equitable distribution requires all marital 
assets
223
 to be distributed equally, unless there has been ―unequal 
treatment.‖224 The court will consider a variety of factors in 
distributing the assets.
225
 A property settlement following a divorce 
is ―final and not modifiable;‖226 therefore, using equitable 
distribution to solve the get problem creates a serious dilemma. 
Situations will arise where a ―divorcing party may not know about 
the barrier to remarriage until after the Final Judgment has been 
entered . . . and you cannot go back and re-do equitable 
distribution.‖227 Alternatively, alimony228 can be modified ―upon a 
                                                        
222 FL. JUD. SERVS., supra note 8, at 6.  
223 Marital assets include ―all property acquired by either spouse during the 
marriage . . . plus interspousal gifts.‖ Bay Hill, supra note 221.  
224 Id.  
225 These factors include:  
contribution to the marriage, economic circumstances, interruption of 
personal career or education by a spouse, contribution by one spouse to 
the career and education of the other, the desirability of one spouse 
retaining a particular asset, the length of the marriage, the desirability 
of retaining the marital home as a residence for dependent children, and 
misconduct that depleted the marital assets within 2 years of filing. 
 Id.  
226 Letter from Nelson Diaz, Florida Attorney, to Kristen Pesicek, 
Legislative Aide, Senator Aronberg (Apr. 21, 2008) (emphasis added) (on file 
with author). 
227 Id.  
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showing of a substantial change in circumstances or financial 
ability to pay of either party.‖229  
This model was utilized in the British case, Brett v. Brett,
230
 
where the court did not deny the husband a divorce, but rather 
raised his alimony payment so that the wife could maintain her 
standard of living. The court explained that this award of 
maintenance could not be used to punish the husband; however, 
the husband‘s actions were taken into account and were relevant to 
some extent.
231
 The court then awarded the wife a lump sum in 
alimony and an additional amount every year until the husband 
gave the wife a get to compensate her for the disadvantage she 
faced by not remarrying and gaining financial security from a new 
husband.
232
 A statute codifying Brett‘s holding would warn the 
husband that in order to hold on to more property and assets, a get 
must be delivered. Additionally, the law would not force or coerce 
the husband to grant his wife a get, but rather place the wife in the 
financial position she would be in if her husband granted her a get 
and she was free to remarry and obtain more property. The get 
statute would also eliminate any extortion the husband may induce 
upon the wife because the court could balance the assets in 
alimony, which it awarded to the wife. Notably, the fact that 
alimony is modifiable would enable the court to change the 
alimony if the husband eventually grants the wife a get, or allow it 
to increase the alimony as well.  
Lastly, Maryland and Florida sponsors should invoke judicial 
                                                        
228 Alimony is a ―support obligation available to either spouse.‖ Bay Hill, 
supra note 221. Maryland law concerning alimony is very similar and would 
allow for alimony modification. The ―Court may Modify the amount of alimony 
awarded as circumstances and justice require.‖ Overviews of the Laws in 
Maryland Regarding Alimony, Alimony in Maryland, http://www.matney 
lawfirm.com/maryland.alimony (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). 
229 Bay Hill, supra note 221. 
230 Brett v. Brett, (1969) 1 W.L.R. 487 (Eng.). In this case, the husband 
refused to grant his wife a get for ―tactical reasons‖ and ―thus precluding the 
possibility of the wife remarrying and finding some other man to support her in 
the event of her wishing to do so.‖ Id. at 488. 
231 The court emphasized ―the wife‘s age and the prospect that she might 
remarry were she to become free to do so . . . .‖ Id.  
232 Id. at 487. 
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precedent to attract widespread support and promote its passage 
into legislation. Legislators will be more persuasive in urging the 
bill‘s passage if they emphasize that jurists have already shown 
that the bill is workable and equitable in practice, as was shown 
over a decade ago in New York. In 1992, for example, this tool 
was utilized to pass the New York equitable distribution 
amendment, following the decision in Schwartz v. Schwartz,
233
 
which held that if a man withholds a get from his wife, such a 
barrier could be taken into account when dividing marital property 
and assets.
234
 New York legislators cited Schwartz for the 
proposition that the equitable distribution amendment merely 
clarified existing law.
235
 Judges already had the equitable 
discretion to make such considerations in factor thirteen of the 
equitable distribution law,
236
 but by passing a law that would apply 
uniformly to such situations the legislature announced that the 
judges‘ considerations were appropriate.  
Similarly, Florida legislators could put greater emphasis in 
their next attempt on the Bloch decision, which implicitly held that 
a court could take a husband‘s withholding of a get into 
consideration when determining equitable distribution and 
alimony.
237
 Using a judicial decision as the backdrop to the bill‘s 
campaign, proponents of the bill would be further justified in 
saying, ―Judge[s] . . . ha[ve] agreed with this and . . . believe that 
the law does empower [them] to do this.‖238 By properly making 
use of such judicial authority, proponents could provide additional 
reassurance to other legislators so that the bill could quickly move 
to passage.  
                                                        
233 153 Misc. 2d 789, 792 (1992). 
234 Zornberg, supra note 35, at 735 (―Justice Rigler found statutory 
authorization for this decision in factor thirteen of the equitable distribution law, 
the ‗catchall‘ provision requiring the court to consider ‗any other factor which 
the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‘‖).  
       235 Id.  
236 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(13) (McKinney 1983). ―[A]ny 
other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.‖ Id.  
237 Bloch v. Bloch, 688 So. 2d 946, 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).  
238 Id. (quoting Anthony Daniele, Matrimonial Attorney).  
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V. CONCLUSION  
This Note recommends that Maryland and Florida adopt get 
legislation in order to alleviate the agunah problem and reform the 
growing coercive and extortive tactics of Jewish husbands 
concerning the terms of delivery of the get. While community 
outreach and contract law have tried to conquer the agunah 
problem, Jewish women remain ―in [a] state of marital limbo.‖239 
The large Jewish populations in both Maryland and Florida suggest 
similarly large groups of women in those states face the agunah 
problem. A legislative effort, which is already under way in states 
that have significant Jewish populations like Maryland and Florida, 
is the best tool to protect these female victims whose religious 
standards pressure them into an inferior bargaining position and de 
facto subordination.  
Maryland and Florida‘s past attempts, though unsuccessful, 
have shown that there is potentially widespread support and 
growing need for help and legislation. If passed, a get statute 
would only require minimal state funds and, if properly drafted, 
could avoid the limited constitutional entanglements with respect 
to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. This Note proposes the New York statute as the 
paradigm for success—substantively, focusing the bill on 
alleviating alimony payments as an incentive to ―remove barriers 
to remarriage‖ instead of the currently-used equitable distribution 
model would provide flexibility without unconstitutionally forcing 
a religious practice. It is also quite possible to present a religiously 
neutral statute, while at the same time galvanize the religious 
communities to support the process. The plight of women suffering 
the agunah problem is serious, and both Florida and Maryland 
need to address it through effective get legislation. 
 
                                                        
239 Feldman, supra note 29, at 140.  
